













Religion and Oppression: Supplementary Online Materials 7

									Faso	(0.52)		(0.82)
Thailand	5.5	Russia	159	(Andorra)	Cyprus	12.5	Sweden	0.96	Indonesia	0.71	Indonesia	0.32
										(0.46)		(0.68)
Iran	6	Turkey	227	(Hong Kong)	S Korea	14.3	Switzerland	0.96	Mali	0.75	Egypt	0.34
										(0.39)		(0.80)
Iraq	6	Vietnam	374	(Iraq)	Jordan	18.4	(Andorra)		Rwanda	0.77	Mali	0.41
										(0.31)		(1.08)
Vietnam	6	Iraq	1451	(Taiwan)	(Andorra)		(Iraq)		Morocco	0.83	Jordan	0.45
										(0.46)		(0.85)
China	6.5	(Serbia)		(Trinidad and Tobago)	(Hong Kong)		(Serbia)		Ghana	0.87	(Rwanda)	
										(0.41)		
Egypt	6.5	(Taiwan)		(Vietnam)	(Taiwan)		(Taiwan)		Jordan	0.91	(Taiwan)	
										(0.35)		

*Note.* Countries listed in ascending order by their variable mean for each variable. Countries without data for a particular variable are listed in parentheses at the bottom of the list.

**SOM section 2: Curvilinear accounts of zero-order relationships between religiosity and oppression**

In Studies 1 and 2, scatterplots of the zero-order relationship between country ranked by oppression (lack of freedom, refugees by country of origin) and religiosity (Figures 1-4 in the main manuscript) suggested a curvilinear relationship that we did not originally anticipate. To assess which kind of curves best fit the scatterplots of the main manuscript, it is appropriate to use analyses different from the ones we used to produce them. We designed the scatterplots of main manuscript Figures 1-4 to be as visually informative as possible. Thus we graphed aggregate religiosity scores by country and also displayed the original oppression scores of countries (log-transformed for refugees) rather than the standardized form of their rank scores.

To appropriately test and model possible curvilinear relationships, however, a visually intuitive scatterplot is less important than a scatterplot that directly reflects the analysis of the main manuscript. The scatterplots below are thus derived from the same analyses we presented in the text of the main manuscript. This analysis includes all individual-level responses for religiosity (recall it was not necessary to standardize these in Study 1 as all measures used the same metric, but we standardized them in Study 2 due the use of different metrics in the latter study). Using a standardized version of the religiosity scale in Study 1 yielded the same *R*s and *F*s as the unstandardized version of the scale. The analysis also includes standardized rank scores representing country-level oppression.

Though our main manuscript's primary interest was in the possible causal impact of religiosity on oppression rather than the zero-order relationship between these variables, the zero-order findings show some interesting consistencies. In our exploratory supplementary analyses we found that both quadratic and cubic curvilinear models explained the most variance, relative to other possible models (linear, inverse). SOM Table 3 lists the key details of the curvilinear regression equations for each analysis of religion's zero-order relationship to oppression. SOM Figures 1 - 4 show the quadratic and cubic curves mapped onto the pattern of data points.

The nature of the best-fitting quadratic equations suggests that, at the zero-order level, as oppressiveness of a country increases, the religiosity of the population at first increases (around moderate oppressiveness) and then decreases (at extreme oppressiveness). The best-fitting cubic equations corroborate this interpretation for Study 1 refugees and Study 2 civil rights and political liberty. However, the cubic equation for Study 1 civil rights and political liberty suggests that religiosity begins high at low levels of oppression, gets lower as oppression increases, and then rises and lowers again. The cubic equation for Study 2 refugees shows the opposite as a final trajectory: at low levels of oppression religion is moderate, then increases with increasing oppression, then decreases, then increases again with extreme oppression.




The fact that quadratic and cubic curves both map relatively well to the data—and that the cubic models point towards opposite trajectories in some cases—suggests substantial predictive ambiguity with regard to the religious implications of particularly high or low oppression in a country. This ambiguity is consistent with the idea that zero-order relationships may not be the ones most relevant for reliably evaluating causal claims regarding religion’s impact on oppression or *vice versa*.

**SOM Table 3**


*R (curvilinear), constant and intercepts (b1, b2 and b3) for quadratic (Q) and cubic (C) equations approximating relationships between national oppression predictors and religiosity (criterion).*

Predictor	Study	Equation	R	Constant	b1	b2	b3
Country (ranked by lack of freedom)	1	Q	.32***	.70	.06	-.11	
Country (ranked by lack of freedom)	1	C	.49***	.66	.35	-.06	-.18
Country (ranked by number of refugees originating)	1	Q	.47***	.78	.13	-.18	
Country (ranked by number of refugees originating)	1	C	.49***	.76	.23	-.14	-.07
Country (ranked by lack of freedom)	2	Q	.36***	.44	.43	-.44	
Country (ranked by lack of freedom)	2	C	.36***	.46	.28	-.53	.11
Country (ranked by number of refugees originating)	2	Q	.30***	.40	.40	-.39	
Country (ranked by number of refugees originating)	2	C	.33***	.59	.16	-.79	.26


SOM Figure 1




SOM Figure 2



SOM Figure 3



SOM Figure 4



**SOM section 3: Zero-order relationships in different development groups (Study 2).**

In Study 2 it was possible to use a categorical approach to hold development constant, partly to examine our research question in different clusters of human development (very high, high/medium, and low), but mostly to concretely illustrate how religiosity could be negatively related to oppression when controlling for human development. Without such a concrete illustration, the meaning of this independent relationship may be difficult to conceptualize. By dividing the sample into three human development ranges and running zero-order correlations in each range, we could “control for” human development in a different and more intuitive way.

We divided the data set into categories that approximate “very high” human development (HDI  $\geq$  .80,  $n$  for countries = 27;  $n$  for participants = 32,960), “high/medium” (.50 to .799,  $n$  for countries = 16,  $n$  for participants = 29,617), and “low” ( $<$  .50,  $n$  for countries = 5,  $n$  for participants = 7575). We picked these categories on the basis of the criteria used by the UNHDP in their 2005 assessment of human development (see, e.g., United Nations Human Development Program, 2017), though we combined the high and medium nations into one group. We then measured zero-order regression coefficients between the national rank predictors—which did not need to be standardized for this analysis—and the two criteria: religiosity and authoritarianism.

We emphasize that our “categorical” analysis is primarily for the purposes of conceptual illustration. In this sample, the proper and most statistically efficient and unbiased analyses relevant to our research questions are the multiple regression analyses we have already summarized in the main manuscript. This additional analysis is to aid conceptual understanding of what the regressions mean: that is, what it can mean to examine the relationship between oppression and religiosity/conservatism while “controlling for” human development. It means holding human development relatively constant, in this case within a certain range, and examining the independent relationship between oppression and religiosity/conservatism within that range.

**Relationships with religiosity.** When dividing the sample this way, indices of national oppression were correlated with religiosity in slightly different ways. However, all relationships were either negative relationships or substantially weaker positive relationships than the zero-order positive relationships found between oppression indices and religiosity in Table 4. In the very high HDI countries, lack of civil and political liberty had a weakly positive zero order relationship to religiosity,  $\beta = .07$ ,  $S\beta = .005$ ,  $t(32,941) = 12.05$ ,  $p < .001$ —meaning that more oppressed countries were slightly more likely to be religious. In high/medium HDI countries, there was a moderate negative zero-order relationship,  $\beta = -.27$ ,  $S\beta = .006$ ,  $t(29601) = -49.10$ ,  $p < .001$ —meaning that more oppressed countries were moderately less likely to be religious. In low HDI countries, the negative relationship between oppression and religiosity was weak

to non-existent,  $\beta = -.02$ ,  $S\beta = .012$ ,  $t(7573) = -1.89$ ,  $p = .06$ . Results were similar, though more strongly negative for high/medium HDI countries, when examining religiosity by national rank in refugees outside the country:  $\beta$ s = .06, -.38 and .03 respectively.

We also note that when controlling for the standardized rank score of human development in each development group (i.e., performing the analysis used for the full sample in each HDI group), there was an even more consistent outcome: For lack of civil and political liberty predicting religiosity,  $\beta$ s = -.22 (very high HDI), -.24 (high/medium HDI) and -.04 (low HDI); for number of refugees originating from the country predicting religiosity,  $\beta$ s = -.16 (very high HDI), -.34 (high/medium HDI) and .05 (low HDI). That is, even within each human development cluster, controlling for human development revealed a negative relationship between national oppression and religiosity.

To concretely illustrate the potentially negative independent relationship between oppression and religiosity—again, primarily for conceptual assistance, not to demonstrate anything more than what multiple regression results have already demonstrated—SOM Figure 5 shows the mean scores in religiosity by national rank in (lack of) civil and political liberty for the 16 medium and high HDI countries for which data on both religiosity and liberty were available. SOM Figure 6 shows the mean scores in religiosity by the number of refugees who have fled each of the 16 countries.

As with the zero-order scatterplots in Figures 2 and 4 of the main manuscript, we log-transformed the refugee data in SOM Figure 6 before graphing it. The number of refugees originating from any country ranged from 1,000 to 374,000 in this subsample.

As SOM Figure 5 shows, the residents of medium/high HDI countries suffering more civil and political oppression were less religious. As SOM Figure 6 shows, the residents of medium/high HDI countries with more refugees originating from them were less religious. The zero-order relationships between variables in these particular countries (high and medium HDI) appear consistent with the negative independent relationships found in the multiple regressions of Tables 3 and 5 in the main manuscript.


**Relationships with authoritarianism.** There were more striking differences between HDI groups when evaluating the relationship of national oppression indices to authoritarianism. We also evaluated HDI differences in how militarization indices related to authoritarianism, as militarization and oppression were both positively related to authoritarianism in the main analyses. In very high HDI countries, the oppression and militarization indices were, as might be expected, positively related to authoritarianism at the individual level,  $.11 < \beta$ s  $< .25$ , all  $ps < .001$ . In the high/medium HDI countries, 3 out of four indices were



positively related, one (refugees) slightly negatively related,  $-.04 < \beta_s < .13$ . In the low HDI countries all four indices were negatively related,  $-.21 < \beta_s < -.05$ .


Though this result varied across HDI groups, it was still broadly consistent with our main findings, especially since the sample sizes and number of countries examined for the low HDI group were much lower than for the other two groups. Nevertheless, these findings raise the possibility that some countries—particularly low development ones—might see liberty benefit from having a more conservative population (or the benefits of relative liberty and stability might inspire more conservatism in these countries, or there may be some other causal process that stimulates both oppression and liberalism in these countries).

**SOM Figure 5**  
**Religiosity by Lack of Civil Rights and Political Liberty in One's Country, Medium and High Development Countries (N for countries = 16, N for individuals = 29,603)**



SOM Figure 6

**Religiosity by Number of Refugees Originating from One's Country, Medium and High Development Countries (N for countries = 16, N for individuals = 29,603)**



**SOM Section 4: Relation of militarization and oppression to religiosity by religion-grouped countries, and means of religion-grouped countries on indices of oppression, militarization, authoritarianism and religiosity.**

It is possible that some religions may cultivate more oppressive or more liberatory understandings of divinity and religious devotion. There are at least two analyses potentially relevant to this question that the large sample of countries in Study 2 made possible.

One analysis is to examine, in different religious groupings of countries, the relationship of national rank in oppression (and militarization) to religiosity. This analysis can offer insight into whether substantial sloughing off of a particular religious tradition is likely to manifest in a liberatory or oppressive way within that tradition's broader cultural, political, historical and topographical context.

Another analysis is to rank religion-grouped countries on various indices of oppression and militarization. This ranking can give a sense of how groups of countries with certain religions predominating have distinguished themselves from each other with regard to oppression over time up to the present period. This analysis offers insight into what result complex cultural, economic, topographical and broadly historical forces have had in their interaction with religious beliefs to produce certain ranks in oppressiveness of religiously-categorized groups of countries at any one time.

Neither analysis can offer clear insight into exactly how the various processes involved have interacted to produce the specific religion-grouped result of any particular historical period. For instance, it is possible that any positive or negative correlation between religiosity and oppression in a religion-grouped set of countries reflects direct causal processes. It is also possible that an unidentified third variable entangled with other features of history, politics, topography, etc. might better explain the relationship.

Likewise, it is possible that religions predominating in the less oppressed countries had cultural and ideological features that cultivated more tolerant, liberatory anti-oppression social and political processes. However, current differences in oppression between religion-grouped countries are unlikely to be fully explained by original differences in worldview benevolence. It is also plausible that countries with a particular religion or set of religions predominating may suffer less oppression than countries with other religions predominating because many of the former countries have had fortunate access to topographical and thus political-economic advantages (Diamond, 1999). Moreover, the more advantaged countries may have exploited their good fortune to effectively dominate and oppress less advantaged countries.

**Relation of oppression and militarization to religiosity, by religious grouping of countries.** In SOM Table 3 we present the relation of oppression and

militarization to religiosity in various categories of countries defined by religion. We divided countries on the basis of whether their predominating religious beliefs were Protestant/mixed Christian, Roman Catholic, Christian Orthodox, Muslim, derived from East and South Asian religions and religious practices (Hinduism, Buddhism, ancestor worship), or unaffiliated/nonreligious (a plurality of a country's respondents listing their religious denomination as "not applicable" in the World Values Survey). We used reported data from the World Values Survey to determine the proportion of different denominations in each country.

To be categorized as "Protestant/mixed Christian", a country's population usually had to be at least 25% Protestant / Evangelical / Presbyterian / Baptist / Anglican / Methodist / Pentecostal while also plurality or majority Christian. Alternatively, the Protestant population had to be roughly evenly split with the closest-sized other Christian population, and Christians together had to form a plurality relative to other religious categories. For instance, Rwanda with a majority Catholic population—52.3%—but also a 29.9% Protestant population we counted as "mixed Christian", while Brazil with a 60.3% majority Catholic population and only 22.6% Protestant population we counted as Catholic. We counted South Korea as "mixed Christian" because the Protestant population (22.8%) and Catholic population (21.3%) were roughly equivalent, and together were more populous than those indicating "not applicable" (28.8%) or those indicating Buddhist (25.0%). Though together Buddhist and "not applicable" formed the majority in South Korea, it did not make theoretical sense to combine them as a single group. To be counted as any other category (Muslim, Orthodox, etc.), that category had to have plurality or majority status in the country relative to other religious categories.

We found one probable error in the World Values Survey data file we analyzed that might distort the results of this analysis (but not the other analyses of the main manuscript). The data file reported Sweden as being 67.6% Roman Catholic, and only 1.6% Protestant. Since the national church of Sweden is the Lutheran church (Protestant), and Swedes generally report as being Lutheran even if highly skeptical about the idea of God (Steinfels, 2009), we expect this may have been a clerical error on the part of those preparing the results of the WVS survey for public downloading.

Thus, in SOM Table 3 we present Sweden as the World Values Survey described it, as a Roman Catholic country, but in brackets we present the Protestant/Mixed Christian results with Sweden included, and the Roman Catholic country results with Sweden excluded. We determined that the WVS survey most likely did not accidentally label some historically Catholic country as Sweden, or if they did so they also erroneously indicated that the interviews in that country were conducted in Swedish and that all interviews were conducted in specific Swedish geographical regions.

**Mean levels of oppression, militarization, authoritarianism and religiosity, by religion-grouped countries.** In SOM Table 4 we provide country-level mean scores of the religion-grouped countries on our indices of oppression and militarization: lack of civil and political liberty as rated by Freedom House, and UNHDP data on number of refugees originating from the country, military spending as a proportion of GDP, and armed forces as a percentage of the population. We also provide religion-grouped individual-level mean scores on our measures of conservatism (authoritarianism) and religiosity in Study 2. The means and standard errors we present are either based on country as the unit of analysis (oppression and militarization analyses) or on the reporting individual (authoritarianism and religiosity analyses).

For all analyses in SOM Table 4, we present religion-grouped countries in order from most oppressive/militarized to least on the four criteria of oppression and militarization, both zero-order and when controlling for the standardized rank in human development as a covariate. We treated Sweden as a Protestant/mixed Christian country in this ranking analysis. Labeling it as a Catholic country instead made little difference to the theoretically relevant outcomes. The demographics controlled for in Tables 3 and 4 were those controlled in the main manuscript: sex, age and highest level of education attained (an index of social class).

**SOM Table 3****Relation of countries, ranked by militarization and oppression, to religiosity, by religion-grouped sets of countries**

Plurality denomination	Controlled in analysis	Oppression's relation to religiosity		Militarization's relation to religiosity	
		Lack of civil rights & political liberty	Refugees originating from the country	Military spending as a proportion of GDP	Armed forces as a percentage of the population
Protestant or mixed Christian*	No controls, zero-order ( <i>r</i> )	.48 [.49]	.39 [.42]	.12 [.12]	-.26 [-.23]
	HDI ( $\beta$ )	.22 [.18]	.18 [.18]	.05 [.05]	-.14 [-.13]
	HDI, demographics ( $\beta$ )	.27 [.22]	.19 [.20]	.03 [.03]	-.19 [-.17]
Catholic*	No controls, zero-order ( <i>r</i> )	.38 [.34]	.36 [.30]	.06 [.16]	-.02 ( <i>p</i> = .07) [-.06]
	HDI ( $\beta$ )	-.12 [-.07]	.03 [.02 ( <i>ns</i> )]	.08 [.09]	-.01 ( <i>ns</i> ) [-.02 ( <i>p</i> = .002)]
	HDI, demographics ( $\beta$ )	-.07 [-.02 ( <i>p</i> = .21, <i>ns</i> )]	.05 [.03]	.09 [.10]	.01 ( <i>ns</i> ) [-.01 ( <i>ns</i> )]
Christian Orthodox	No controls, zero-order ( <i>r</i> )	-.04	-.06	-.21	-.27
	HDI ( $\beta$ )	-.35	-.35	-.24	-.23
	HDI, demographics ( $\beta$ )	-.33	-.33	-.23	-.19
Muslim	No controls, zero-order ( <i>r</i> )	-.09	-.23	-.06	-.13
	HDI ( $\beta$ )	-.02 ( <i>p</i> = .01)	-.08	.01 ( <i>ns</i> )	.10
	HDI, demographics ( $\beta$ )	-.03	-.09	.00 ( <i>ns</i> )	.09
South Asian and East Asian (e.g. Hindu, Buddhist)	No controls, zero-order ( <i>r</i> )	-.21	-.49	.07	-.54
	HDI ( $\beta$ )	-.72	-.68	.07	-.72
	HDI, demographics ( $\beta$ )	-.67	-.65	.07	-.67
"Not applicable" (no affiliation)	No controls, zero-order ( <i>r</i> )	-.24	-.23	.07	.21
	HDI ( $\beta$ )	-.28	-.22	.18	.13
	HDI, demographics ( $\beta$ )	-.28	-.21	.19	.14

*Note.* Unless otherwise indicated, all  $ps < .001$ . HDI is the Human Development Index. Demographics were authoritarianism, sex, age and educational attainment. Countries analyzed as Protestant or mixed Christian were Australia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, New Zealand, Rwanda, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, USA, Zambia ( $22.8 \leq$  Protestant proportion  $\leq 82.0$ ;  $44.2 \leq$  all Christian proportion  $\leq 84.9$ ). Countries analyzed as Roman Catholic were Andorra, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden\* ( $54.3 \leq$  Roman Catholic proportion  $\leq 94.4$ ). Countries analyzed as Christian Orthodox were Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine ( $49.4 \leq$  Orthodox proportion  $\leq 92.3$ ). Countries analyzed as Muslim were Burkina Faso, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco, Turkey ( $53.3 \leq$  Muslim proportion  $\leq 99.3$ ). Countries analyzed as populated by adherents of South Asian or East Asian religions were India, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam ( $71.2 \leq$  Ancestral worshipping/Buddhist/Cao Dai/Hoa Hao/Hindu/ Jain/"Native"/Sikh/Taoist/Yiguan Dao proportion  $\leq 96.8$ ). Countries analyzed as "not applicable" (unaffiliated) were Britain, China, France, Hong Kong, Japan, the Netherlands ( $46.0 \leq$  "not applicable" proportion  $\leq 88.7$ ).

\*In brackets we present the Protestant/Mixed Christian results with Sweden included, and the Roman Catholic results with Sweden excluded



**SOM Table 4**

**National means of oppression, militarization, authoritarianism and religiosity, by religion-grouped sets of countries**

Lack of civil rights and political liberty [oppression]					
No covariates controlled		Controlling for country (ranked by HDI)			
Religious category	Mean (SE)	Religious category	Estimated Marginal Mean (SE)		
Muslim	4.30 (.48)	South and East Asian	3.82 (.76)		
South and East Asian	3.88 (.76)	Unaffiliated	3.36 (.56)		
Orthodox	2.94 (.54)	Muslim	3.16 (.48)		
Unaffiliated	2.42 (.62)	Orthodox	2.67 (.49)		
Prot/Mixed Christian	1.81 (.42)	Prot/Mixed Christian	2.17 (.36)		
Catholic	1.59 (.46)	Catholic	1.95 (.41)		
Refugees originating from the country (1000s) [oppression]					
No covariates controlled		Controlling for country (ranked by HDI)			
Religious category	Mean (SE)	Religious category	EMM(SE)		
Muslim	183.20 (66.94)	South and East Asian	119.66 (39.54)		
South and East Asian	131.67 (122.21)	Orthodox	42.15 (25.32)		
Orthodox	46.86 (80.00)	Unaffiliated	36.85 (29.31)		
Unaffiliated	23.50 (86.41)	Muslim	28.84 (24.88)		
Catholic	9.46 (63.82)	Catholic	14.72 (21.24)		
Prot/Mixed Christian	8.15 (58.71)	Prot/Mixed Christian	13.32 (18.87)		
Military spending as a proportion of GDP [militarization]					
No covariates controlled		Controlling for country (ranked by HDI)			
Religious category	Mean (SE)	Religious category	EMM (SE)		
Muslim	3.16 (.39)	Muslim	3.14 (.45)		
Orthodox	2.23 (.42)	Orthodox	2.17 (.46)		
South and East Asian	1.95 (.83)	Unaffiliated	1.96 (.58)		
Unaffiliated	1.94 (.53)	South and East Asian	1.94 (.87)		

		East Asian			
Prot/Mixed Christian	1.85 (.34)	Prot/Mixed Christian	1.86 (.36)		
Catholic	1.83 (.37)	Catholic	1.84 (.39)		
Armed forces as a percentage of the population [militarization]					
No covariates controlled		Controlling for country (ranked by HDI)			
Religious category	Mean (SE)	Religious category	EMM (SE)		
Muslim	6.14 (1.09)	Muslim	7.18 (1.26)		
Orthodox	5.16 (1.22)	Orthodox	5.74 (1.28)		
South and East Asian	3.80 (1.99)	South and East Asian	4.92 (2.01)		
Prot/Mixed Christian	3.50 (.96)	Prot/Mixed Christian	2.98 (.96)		
Catholic	3.18 (1.09)	Catholic	2.74 (1.08)		
Unaffiliated	2.84 (1.54)	Unaffiliated	1.52 (1.62)		
Authoritarianism (average standard score)					
No covariates controlled		Controlling for country (ranked by HDI)		Controlling for country (ranked by HDI) and demographics	
Religious category	Mean (SE)	Religious category	EMM (SE)	Religious category	EMM (SE)
Muslim	0.17 (.01)	Muslim	0.05 (.01)	Muslim	0.05 (.01)
South and East Asian	0.04 (.01)	Orthodox	-0.10 (.01)	Orthodox	-0.07 (.01)
Orthodox	-0.08 (.01)	South and East Asian	-0.11 (.01)	South and East Asian	-0.12 (.01)
Catholic	-0.37 (.01)	Catholic	-0.27 (.01)	Catholic	-0.28 (.01)
Unaffiliated	-0.51 (.01)	Unaffiliated	-0.31 (.01)	Unaffiliated	-0.33 (.01)
Prot/Mixed Christian	-0.67 (.01)	Prot/Mixed Christian	-0.58 (.01)	Prot/Mixed Christian	-0.58 (.01)
Religiosity (average standard score)					
No covariates controlled		Controlling for country (ranked by HDI)		Controlling for country (ranked by HDI) and demographics	
Religious category	Mean (SE)	Religious category	EMM (SE)	Religious category	EMM (SE)
Muslim	0.60 (.01)	Muslim	0.34 (.01)	Muslim	0.35 (.01)
Catholic	0.07 (.01)	Catholic	0.27 (.01)	Catholic	0.28 (.01)
Orthodox	-0.05 (.01)	Prot/Mixed Christian	0.06 (.01)	Prot/Mixed Christian	0.05 (.01)
Prot/Mixed Christian	-0.07 (.01)	Orthodox	-0.11 (.01)	Orthodox	-0.12 (.01)
South and	-0.31 (.01)	South and	-0.49 (.01)	South and	-0.52 (.01)

East Asian		East Asian		East Asian	
Unaffiliated	-1.12 (.01)	Unaffiliated	-0.77 (.01)	Unaffiliated	-0.77 (.01)

*Note.* Rank of HDI (Human Development Index) standardized for the analyses

**Implications.** SOM Table 3 suggests that in most religious categories (including the non-religious “not applicable” category) religiosity is *negatively* related to oppression. This is the case both zero-order and when controlling for human development and other demographics. This finding is consistent with the multiple regression results of Studies 1 and 2 in the main manuscript (a negative independent relation between religiosity and oppression), though not with the zero-order results (a positive relation). The findings for Protestant/mixed Christian countries and Roman Catholic countries were more consistent with those of Studies 1 and 2 with regard to zero-order analyses (positive relations between religiosity and oppression). However, the positive relations were much stronger in these groups.

In contrast to the main findings of Studies 1 and 2 (which found a negative relationship between religiosity and oppression when controlling for human development), Protestant/mixed Christian countries continued to show a positive relationship between religiosity and oppression when controlling for human development and demographics. In Catholic countries there was a weaker and more inconsistent pattern of multiple regression results with regard to oppression. The number of refugees originating from Roman Catholic countries was weakly but significantly positively related to religiosity even when controlling for the Human Development Index and demographics, while the independent relationship of religiosity to lack of liberty was weakly negative or null.

Paradoxically, the countries in which we found religious processes *positively* or inconsistently related to oppression—the mixed Christian and Roman Catholic countries—were, according to SOM Table 4, also the countries with the *most* civil liberties and political rights and the *fewest* refugees originating from them. In other words, the countries in which religiosity was *positively* related to oppression appeared to be the *least* oppressive by global standards. And the countries in which we found religious processes *negatively* related to oppression—Orthodox, Muslim, South and East Asian and plurality/majority unaffiliated countries—were the countries with the *lowest* institutional standards of protecting civil liberties and political rights and the *most* refugees originating from them. In other words, the countries in which religiosity was *negatively* related with oppression appeared to be the *most* oppressive by global standards.

**Religiosity and authoritarianism having conflicting relations to oppression.** The religion-grouped countries ranked lowest in oppression in SOM Table 4 (Catholic and Protestant/mixed Christian countries) were also ranked lower in authoritarianism than they were in religiosity. It is as if the religiosity that co-occurs with authoritarianism “outran” that authoritarianism in these countries. The countries ranked highest in oppression after controlling for human development—countries with South and East Asian religions predominating, and plurality unaffiliated countries—showed the opposite pattern: authoritarianism outrunning religiosity. Christian Orthodox countries—which

were middling on oppression measured as lack of civil rights and political liberty but high on oppression measured by refugees originating from the country, also showed this pattern of authoritarianism outrunning religiosity. A set of countries more consistently middling in HDI-adjusted oppression rankings—Muslim plurality and majority countries—were ranked equally high on authoritarianism and religiosity. It is as if the two related psychological inclinations of religiosity and authoritarianism worked at cross-purposes with regard to Muslim countries' HDI-adjusted global rank in oppression.

These results are consistent with the findings of our main manuscript that religiosity is negatively related to oppression when controlling for human development and other demographics, while exclusivity and authoritarianism remain positively related to such oppression under these analytic conditions. The results are also consistent with the findings of Hansen and Ryder (2016) that intrinsic religiosity and coalitional rigidity are co-occurring inclinations that nevertheless have opposing independent relations to religion-based intergroup hostility and intolerance.

**Inconsistent relations between religiosity and militarization.** There did not appear to be a coherent pattern with regard to religion's relationship to militarization. Different measures of militarization sometimes had opposing relations to religiosity in some countries. Also, for any measure of militarization, some religion-based national groups showed positive, some negative and some null relations between religiosity and that measure. The only consistent effect was that controlling for human development did not have much impact on these patterns of relation. The relation of religiosity to militarization appears to be idiosyncratic and contingent on other factors.

**Possible explanations.** Confidently identifying the best explanation for the paradox our analysis turned up—that the countries in which religiosity was *positively* related to oppression appeared to be the *least* oppressive by global standards, and *vice versa*—is beyond the scope of our main manuscript's limited analytic intentions. It is plausible that religiously Western (Catholic and Protestant) countries enjoy the most liberty because the specific revolutionary ideal of liberty was first nourished autonomously in the Western--including Catholic and Protestant--cultural context (for a variety of reasons, some possibly traceable to the topography of the Western European land mass) and so has had a longer time to become effectively established in that cultural context. More puzzling is why devotional adherence to the religions partly defining the identities of Western countries is negatively related to liberty in these countries, while religious adherence is positively related to liberty in other countries.

We speculate tentatively that the paradox may relate to something distinctive about the processes of sloughing off religion in the Protestant / Catholic West (and countries influenced by it). These processes may have meaningful differences from the process of religious decline in nations that Huntington (1993) categorized as "The Rest." For instance, Western religious decline may have been more autonomously directed: developed from within rather than imposed from without, and historically linked with revolutionary politics challenging the relations of power. To the extent this historical characterization is correct, Western states that have experienced more religious decline

probably did so as part of a process of challenging hierarchical powers and empowering ordinary people to direct local and national affairs, as with the French and other liberal revolutions.

To the extent that religious decline occurs in other regions of the world, it may not derive as reliably from autonomous ideologically indigenous revolutionary challenges to existing political authority. It may derive more reliably from the increased influence of Western powers or at least from their religion-supplanting materialist ideologies (like capitalism or communism). Many instances of religious decline outside the West may be considered “non-autonomous” in this sense even to the extent religion-supplanting Western ideologies spread as part of a grassroots political revolution directed explicitly against Western imperialism. For instance, communist revolutions in surveyed countries like Russia, China and Vietnam—revolutions with an anti-religious character and with long-term outcomes that have been characterized as oppressive by Freedom House and that have produced hundreds of thousands of fleeing refugees—were all based on the violent ascendance of a Marxist materialist ideology with its genesis in the West.

This process of ideological materialization may be especially evident as political-economic power advantages, combined with technological advances in communication, enables Western-incubated ideologies to culturally and psychologically colonize the globe in increasingly thoroughgoing ways. As just noted, these Western-incubated ideologies include those, like communism, that most existing Western powers perceive as inconvenient or inimical to their political-economic interests.

The partial or full substitution of Western materialist ideologies for indigenous (or effectively indigenized) religious, supernatural and spiritual beliefs and practices does not inevitably result from capitalist or communist political reforms. However, a country arguably invites some degree of this kind of substitution to the extent it submits to the structural logic of a Western materialist ideology. It is possible to maintain indigenous cultural and religious integrity while adopting other structural features of Western materialist ideology, but this can potentially be a difficult trick to pull off.

A politically assertive population may assist the accomplishment of such a trick. A politically-assertive population can effectively pressure its ruling elites to accommodate ordinary people’s interests. These interests potentially include inclinations to preserve the most popular aspects of the rich meaning systems that have defined cultural self-understanding for millennia. This political assertion is meaningful to liberty because when masses of ordinary people successfully mount assertions of popular will, liberty of some form is implicated. These assertions are likely either to be preceded by or to result in greater *de facto* institutional respect for people’s rights, liberties and dignity.

**Communism, liberty and the example of Kerala.** As noted in the main manuscript, current or former communist countries dominate the less-religious more-oppressed quadrant of the many countries we investigated. In general, it appears that the Western materialist ideology of communism has made a distinctive contribution to the atrophying of religious belief worldwide. Though this hostility to religion may be directly traceable

to communist anti-religious ideology, it is still an open question whether the diminishing effect communist governance has had on religion also received input from the egalitarian reforms pursued under communism or from the historical alignment of communist ideology with skepticism about the revolutionary value of parliamentary elections, political rights and civil liberties.

This question is relevant to the paradoxical findings noted above. Our tentative explanation for these findings is that decline of religion in religiously non-Western contexts may result from common circumstances surrounding the transmission of Western materialist ideologies, like communism. That transmission, when meeting resistance, has sometimes involved sidestepping or trampling rights and liberties to suppress religious belief, insofar as religious belief was perceived as a source of that resistance. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, for instance, encouraged violence and persecution towards religious practitioners and destruction of many Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist temple artifacts and texts as part of the revolutionary cultural transformation. In more recent decades, China's post-Maoist more-capitalist-than-communist-but-still-materialist government has undertaken severe persecution the Falun Gong spiritual movement to add to its persecution of Muslim Uighurs, Tibetan Buddhists, and Vatican-loyal Roman Catholics, among others. The destruction wrought by the Cultural Revolution and the continuing religious persecution today would arguably have been much circumscribed were there solid and longstanding institutions of protecting liberty in China.

It is potentially helpful to examine a cultural and historical context where widespread adoption of communist (and thus Western materialist) ideology did *not* go ideologically hand-in-glove with contempt for parliamentary democracy, political rights and civil liberty. One of the few politically autonomous municipalities in the world that has consistently elected ideologically communist governments in competitive elections permitting free speech, free political association and free assembly is the state of Kerala in India (Nossiter, 1982). India's non-aligned role in the Cold War and its relatively adequate protection of the civil liberties and political rights essential to a sustainable parliamentary democracy enabled voters in its states to freely experiment with various ideological forms, including communism. Kerala, as a state within a liberty-protecting democratic country that regularly elects communist governments, arguably combines communism with liberty. One might expect that, to the extent that both communism and liberty seem independently correlated with religious decline, any political entity that combines these features should precipitate a particularly steep religious decline. And yet there is no evidence of such decline in Kerala.

Today more than 99% of Keralans identify either with Hinduism, Islam or Christianity (Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, 2011). Of the 18 Indian states where the World Values Survey interviews were conducted, Kerala ranked 9<sup>th</sup> on our five-item religiosity measure, essentially at India's median. A one-way ANOVA with pre-planned contrast between Kerala and all other Indian states found no significant difference in religiosity,  $|t| < 1$ . Kerala, like India generally, is higher than the world average in religiosity, with an average standardized religiosity score of 0.21 (.21 of a

standard deviation above the sample mean). Yet Kerala is also one of the least authoritarian of India's states, ranked 17<sup>th</sup> out of 18 states on our measure of authoritarianism. Keralan authoritarianism is much lower than the Indian average,  $t(1655) = -5.78$   $p < .001$ , and also lower than our World Values Survey sample average, with a standardized authoritarianism score of  $-.55$ . Thus Kerala presents another case of religiosity “outrunning” authoritarianism, and a relatively unique case of religiosity being higher than the world average and yet authoritarianism lower.

The sustainability of Keralan religious life may at least partly result from the fact that the communist governments of Kerala have, with electoral sustainability plausibly in mind, largely left religion alone. Instead of striving to wipe out religious beliefs and persecute religious institutions and movements, competitively-elected communist governments in Kerala have focused on practical egalitarian political and economic aspirations, consistent with communist visions of progressive material social change. To this end, Kerala has achieved distinctively high literacy (Raman, 2005), low infant mortality (Suryanarayana, 2008) and high life expectancy rates. The life expectancy, for instance, in Kerala is the highest in India (National Commission on Population, 2006) and also exceeds the average of the current and former communist world (Hauck, 2016). And in spite of having a religiously diverse population that has experienced increased religious tensions in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Menon, 2016), Kerala has not suffered the kind of genocidal sectarian violence that has sometimes erupted after the dissolution of one-party-state communist countries like the former Yugoslavia, and to a less lethal extent in more inequality-affected parts of India, e.g., Gujrat (Dhattiwala & Biggs, 2012).

There must nevertheless have been tension between religious traditionalism and the egalitarian model pursued by Keralan communist governments. Initiatives throughout India to educate Dalits and other lower caste Hindus have historically met with religiously-based upper caste resistance (Paik, 2016), and Kerala was likely no exception. However, perhaps because the Indian political context pressured elected communist governments to be sensitive to human rights obligations and democratic accountability, those governments are not perceived to have responded to reactionary religious tendencies oppressively or violently.

It is plausible that the elected communist governments of Kerala confronted religious resistance to its policies with no more force than a legitimate and election-wary government was prepared to wield. In any case religion in Kerala appears to have evolved gently while remaining robustly central to cultural life there. It is no longer considered a mainstream Hindu position in Kerala to oppose the education of Dalits, for instance, though such opposition can still be found at the margins. And violence against Dalits, though it exists in Kerala, is the lowest in India: 102 cases in Kerala compared to 44,000 in the rest of India according to a 2017 report (Deccan Chronicle, 2017).

Thus the broad psychological proclivities to religiosity—which have otherwise remained robust in Kerala—have adjusted to a changing cultural and economic environment. These proclivities have not been violently and oppressively traumatized out of the Keralan population as they have in many other communist and former communist

societies (and in torturous detention centers for religiously-threatening individuals, like the Guantanamo Bay prison, ironically often run by countries who were historically on the opposite side of communism during the Cold War). Thus Kerala has pulled off the “trick” of adapting to a Western materialist ideology without causing a precipitous religious decline, and it appears that the protection of liberty has played a role in religion’s stability in Kerala.

This Keralan example underscores the idea that religion in religiously non-Western countries, at least sometimes, may need institutional liberty to continue thriving against the global structural and ideological tide of Western materialism. Conversely, religious decline in countries outside “The West” may often result from those country’s leaders crushing or sidestepping popular assertiveness—that is, oppressing people—in service of materialist transformation. Though this speculative explanation is more of a liberty-nourishes-religion (or oppression-stunts-religion) explanation, it does not preclude the possibility of religion nourishing liberty, particularly given the central role played by religiously devout leaders in the national liberation histories of countries like India (Easwaran, 1999; Heredia, 2009).

This salient role of religion in India’s national liberation may offer some additional insight, in fact, into the distinctiveness of Keralan religiosity. That religiosity presents a contrast with the sloughing off of religious faith that has occurred in democratic social welfare states outside India, particularly in Europe. European social welfare states are otherwise comparable to Kerala in having made extensive egalitarian social reforms. As noted earlier, though, Europe earned many of its enshrined rights and liberties by secularizing populations challenging saliently religious authority. But in India, religion—particularly Hinduism (Heredia, 2009) and Islam (Easwaran, 1999)—played a strong role in the history of national liberation against the colonial imposers of (arguably more secular) British imperial authority. Thus Kerala as an Indian state should not be as culturally inclined to be a site of autonomous religious decline the way, say, democratically-responsive liberty-respecting European social welfare states are.

The majority of Indian citizens—including Keralans—who are inclined to embrace the changed relations of power that define their foundation as a modern nation (the end of the British Raj and officially-imposed European colonialism) should be more inclined to freely embrace religion because religion played such a key role in those changed relations of power. Or they should at least see the popular embrace of religion as little more than an ideologically protean, peacefully manageable and fundamentally human tendency. Judging by India’s national scores on our religiosity index, Indians generally do not see religion as an existentially threatening social or neurological disease calling for violent and oppressive “cures”.



**SOM section 5: Criterion variables in Studies 1 and 2 differing from the dependent variable of Study 3**

In studies 1 and 2, our analyses employed oppressiveness and militarization of countries (i.e. countries ranked according to a particular measure of oppressiveness or militarization) as predictor variables and religiosity/conservatism of individuals as the criterion variables. To the extent that the religiosity/conservatism of individuals can influence the oppressiveness of countries and vice versa (see p. 4 of the main manuscript), our analyses are conceptually correlational. They are also methodologically correlational as multiple regressions are essentially correlational analyses that control for variables identified as potentially overlapping with the variables of interest.

We note, however, that some statistical analysis packages like SPSS refer to predictor variables in multiple regression as “independent variables” and criterion variables as “dependent variables.” This choice of input labels misleadingly implies a causal relationship directed from the former to the latter. If readers understand oppressiveness of countries as an experimentally-manipulated IV and religiosity and conservatism variables as experimentally-affected DVs they will be confused in the third study to see reminders of religiosity vs. conservatism vs. control as IVs and support for oppression/militarization as a DV.

This confusion, however, is based on an understanding of multiple regression predictors and criteria that we did not intend. We intended predictors and criteria to be seen as causally ambiguous in the first two studies, and we attempted to emphasize this understanding for readers in the main manuscript (pp. 3-4, pp. 24-25). Moreover, in the third study, we employed religiosity vs. conservatism vs. control as IVs and support for oppression/militarization as a DV because, as we noted on page 3 of the main manuscript, we “are concerned about whether religion causes oppression... rather than whether oppression causes religion.”

We could have tried to relieve readers’ confusion by ignoring all the individual-level responses per country in Studies 1 and 2 and simply worked with the aggregate religiosity and conservatism scores in each country as predictor variables, and with national oppression and militarization as criteria. That would have meant using sample sizes of 10 and 52 respectively for these analyses. This, however, would have failed to respect how many individuals’ responses were gathered in each country. This would be the statistical equivalent of comparing 1000 Republicans to 1000 Democrats with regard to some psychological trait but using only an  $n$  of 2 for the analysis. We do not think this indifference to the number of participants gathered in each country is warranted. Acknowledging the relevance of the number of participants surveyed per country requires, however, using individual religiosity and conservatism responses as criteria, and country (ranked by oppression or militarization indices) as predictor.

**SOM section 6: Full set of items used in Study 3 scales**

As a supplement to Table 6 in the main manuscript, SOM Table 5 below details the full set of items used for the independent variables, dependent variables, and correlational analyses of Study 3.

**SOM Table 5**  
**Items composing scales completed in Study 3, scale range from 1 “totally untrue” to 9 “totally true” unless otherwise indicated**

Function in Study 3	Source from which items were adapted [scale range in brackets]	Items [reverse-scored items noted as (R)]
“Religiosity first” items	Hoge’s (1972) Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale	1. My religious belief involves all of my life.
		2. I refuse to let religious considerations influence my everyday activities. (R)
		3. One should seek Divine guidance when making every important decision.
		4. In my life I experience the presence of the Divine.
		5. I feel there are many more important things in life than religion. (R)
		6. My faith sometimes restricts my actions.
		7. Nothing is as important to me as serving the Divine as best I know how.
		8. It doesn’t matter so much what I believe as long as I lead a moral life. (R)
		9. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.
		10. My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life.
	Item used to measure religiosity in Studies 1 and 2	1. I believe in God
	Items used to measure religiosity in Study 1	2. Death is not the end
		3. I regularly attend an organized religious service
		4. I would die for my beliefs
		5. I pray regularly

	Items used to measure religiosity in Study 2	6. God is important in my life
		7. Religion is important to me
		8. I am a religious person
		9. I have moments of prayer and meditation
“Authoritarianism first” items	Manganelli Rattazzi, Bobbio & Canova’s (2007) shortened Right Wing Authoritarianism scale	1. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.
		2. The majority of those who criticize proper authorities in government and religion only create useless doubts in people’s minds.
		3. Radicals and others who have rebelled against the established culture are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who call themselves “patriots”. (R)
		4. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path.
		5. A lot of our rules regarding sexual behavior are just customs which are not necessarily any better or truer than those which other people follow. (R)
		6. What our country really needs instead of more “civil rights” is a good stiff dose of law and order.
		7. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. (R)
		8. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional family values.” (R)
		9. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should learn.
		10. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else. (R)
		11. The facts on crime, sexual immorality and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order.
		12. People should pay less attention to the Country and Culture, and instead develop their

		own personal standards of what is moral and immoral. (R)
		13. What our country needs most is disciplined citizens, following national leaders in unity.
		14. It is good that nowadays young people have greater freedom to make their own rules and to protest against things they don't like. (R)
	Measure analyzed as indicative of exclusivity in Study 1	1. My beliefs are the only true beliefs
	Measures analyzed as indicative of authoritarianism in Study 2 [from 1 "totally bad" to 9 "totally good"]	1. Having the army rule our country
		2. Having a strong leader rule our country
		3. Having experts make decisions in our country
		4. Having the army take over when our country's government is incompetent
Measure of support for intolerance of like-minded people and enemies (correlate)	Sullivan, Pierson & Marcus' (1982) Political Tolerance Scale	1. People who <i>share</i> my beliefs and values should be BANNED from being political leaders of our country.
		2. <i>Enemies</i> of my beliefs and values should be BANNED from being political leaders of our country.
		3. People who <i>share</i> my beliefs and values should be ALLOWED to teach in public schools. (R)
		4. <i>Enemies</i> of my beliefs and values should be ALLOWED to teach in public schools. (R)
		5. Groups formed by people who <i>share</i> my beliefs and values should be OUTLAWED.
		6. Groups formed by <i>enemies</i> of my beliefs and values should be OUTLAWED.
		7. People who <i>share</i> my beliefs and values should be ALLOWED to make speeches in our community. (R)
		8. <i>Enemies</i> of my beliefs and values should be

		ALLOWED to make speeches in our community. (R)
		9. People who <i>share</i> my beliefs and values should have their PHONE CONVERSATIONS SECRETLY LISTENED TO by our government.
		10. <i>Enemies</i> of my beliefs and values should have their PHONE CONVERSATIONS SECRETLY LISTENED TO by our government.
		11. People who <i>share</i> my beliefs and values should be ALLOWED to hold rallies in our community. (R)
		12. <i>Enemies</i> of my beliefs and values should be ALLOWED to hold rallies in our community. (R)
Measure of support for militarization and oppression	Lack of civil and political rights (Studies 1 and 2)	1. It is very important that everyone, even people I count as my enemies, have their political rights protected—including the right to free speech, the right to religious practice, the right to peaceably assemble, and the right to receive due process in legal matters. (R)
		2. I and other good people who follow the path of truth should have our political rights protected, but our enemies do not deserve to have these rights protected.
		3. It is very important that everyone, even people I count as my enemies, have their civil rights protected—including the right to pursue employment without discrimination, the right to eat and live where others are allowed to eat and live, the right to teach in public schools, and the right to run for public office. (R)
		4. I and other good people who follow the path of truth should have our civil rights protected, but our enemies do not deserve to have these rights protected.
	Refugees originating from the country (Studies 1 and 2)	5. It would be terrible if my country persecuted any people—even my enemies—so terribly that they had to flee to another country as refugees. (R)
		6. If any leaders persecuted my enemies so badly that they fled to other countries, they would be doing a great favor to our nation.
	Armed forces as a percentage of the population (Studies 1 and 2)	7. It would be good if the jobs available to our country's people were mostly military jobs so we could battle our enemies more effectively.
		8. Most people should devote their working lives

		to doing gentle good for others rather than to harming and killing enemies. (R)
	Military spending as a proportion of GDP (Studies 1 and 2)	9. Our country should spend a greater share of our national wealth on the military and on wars battling our enemies.
		10. It would be best for everyone if our nation's military spending could be reduced so our economic production could be directed to other concerns. (R)

**SOM section 7: Explanation for the contrasts we focused on in Study 3**

In Study 3, we first ascertained that there was no difference between the control and authoritarianism reminder (authoritarianism first) conditions and then contrasted these non-differing combined conditions with the religiosity reminder (religiosity first) condition.

We understand that there is legitimate interest in the comparison of religiosity first to control, the comparison of religiosity first to authoritarianism first, and even the combination of religiosity first and control compared to authoritarianism first. However, the more analyses researchers do, the more they lose their confidence in the statistical significance of any of their individual analyses. We did not wish to handicap the power of our analyses in this way, and we are not convinced that our hypotheses warranted it either.

We thus consider the confidence intervals of Figure 5 of the main manuscript sufficient to speak to the reliability of the other possible comparisons of interest.

To satisfy curiosity, however, we detail below two other potentially interesting contrasts (religiosity first vs. control and religiosity first vs. authoritarianism first) expressed in *t*-values and *p*-values.

Without correcting for multiple comparisons, the religiosity first and control conditions differed marginally significantly,  $t(99) = -1.74, p = .085$ , and religiosity first differed significantly from authoritarianism first,  $t(150) = -2.60, p = .01$ .

**SOM section 8: Details on the 5-way ANOVA of Study 3**

Our 5-way ANOVA controlling for demographics and interactions in Study 3 greatly reduced degrees of freedom in the analysis, making us necessarily circumspect about speaking to demographic moderation of our main findings. We did not find such demographic moderation, but a conclusion that there was no such moderation carries some risk of Type II error, given the reduced power. We would argue, though, that the reduction in power was not sufficient to make the analysis meaningless, as error *df* = 81. No demographic interaction with experimental condition was significant in this analysis, even before making a Bonferroni correction for multiple tests, all *F*s < 1.68.

Only one purely demographic interaction (citizenship X race) was pre-Bonferroni significant ( $p = .048$ ) and only two other demographic correlations with the DV (race and religion) had  $F$  values greater than 1.8. No demographic main effects or interactions were significant when using Bonferroni-adjusted  $\alpha$ s. Together we consider these results as providing sufficient warrant to retain the null regarding demographic moderation of the main ANOVA results, and without great risk of Type II error.

To the extent that the experimental effects of Study 3 did not differ by race, sex, religion or nationality it suggests that the effects found might be quite broadly generalizable.

### **SOM section 9: Non-equivalence of our conservatism measures**

As noted on pages 12 and 20 of the main manuscript, we could not find a more secular measure of conservatism in the BBC sample of Study 1, nor could we find a more religious measure of conservatism in the WVS sample of Study 2. There is thus not as much conceptual overlap between our conservatism variables as we would wish between studies. Nevertheless, these variables arguably represent fundamental, though differing, aspects of conservatism. In previous studies (e.g. Hansen & Ryder, 2016) exclusivity and authoritarianism not only empirically overlapped but also played similar predictive roles that were opposed to the predictive role of more basic religiosity—for instance making opposing predictions of intergroup hostility. We replicated this contrast in the control condition of Study 3 (see main manuscript p. 33).

Our measures of exclusivity and authoritarianism in Study 3 are also different from what they are in Studies 1 and 2, but part of the purpose of Study 3 was to show the empirical overlap between psychology scale measures of religiosity, exclusivity and authoritarianism and the ones we used in Studies 1 and 2. We would argue that the common empirical relationships found between (a) conservatism measured different ways and (b) support for oppression speaks to our investigation of this relationship showing converging operations.

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