Two-Sided Market Practice 2

Prepared by:

Joseph Malkevitch
Mathematics Department
York College (CUNY)
Jamaica, NY 11451

email: 

malkevitch@york.cuny.edu

web page: 

http://york.cuny.edu/~malk/

1. Apply the Gale/Shapley Algorithm twice: once with the men proposing and once with the women proposing. (Can you find all of the stable matchings?)

Men's preferences:

	w1	w2	w3	w4
m1	3	1	4	2
m2	2	4	1	3
m3	3	1	2	4
m4	2	4	3	1

Women's preferences:

	w1	w2	w3	w4
m1	2	3	1	2
m2	1	4	4	1
m3	4	2	3	4
m4	3	1	2	3